Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
Faculty Articles

School of Law Faculty Scholarship

5-2017

The CFPB Proposed Arbitration Ban, the Rule, the Data, and Some
Considerations for Change
Ramona L. Lampley
St. Mary's University School of Law, rlampley@stmarytx.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ramona L. Lampley, The CFPB Proposed Arbitration Ban, the Rule, the Data, and Some Considerations for
Change, Bus. L. Today (May 2017).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact
sfowler@stmarytx.edu, jcrane3@stmarytx.edu.

Click to view the latest

May 2017

Business Law TODAY

BUSINESS LAW TODAY
The CFPB Proposed Arbitration Ban,
the Rule, the Data, and Some
Considerations for Change
By Ramona L. Lampley

Predispute consumer arbitration has sparked
energetic debate and sharp divides over the
utility of the class action versus the utility
of individual arbitration. Thus far, the U.S.
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has given a
“thumbs up” approach to predispute consumer arbitration waivers, which almost always include a class waiver agreement. In
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.
S. 333, 347–48 (2011), the Supreme Court
implicitly approved predispute class-action
waivers, when it held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted California
state law, which tended to hold such agreements unconscionable in consumer cases.
Then in American Express Company v.
Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304,
2309 (2013), the Court rejected the argument that aggregate, or class litigation, is
necessary to preserve the opportunity to vindicate low-value, statutory claims. Congress
showed little interest in amending the FAA,
even for consumer cases. It seemed that consumer arbitration was the “wild west” of the
law, in that it was largely unregulated and
could direct claims to the black hole of private dispute resolution.

The CFPB Proposes an Arbitration
Prohibition

But then entered the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB). In May 2016,
the CFPB issued a proposed rule prohibiting
predispute arbitration agreements in providing consumer financial services products.
This rule would prohibit mandatory predispute arbitration agreements in consumer
agreements for items such as checking or
savings accounts, credit cards, student loans,
payday loans, automobile leases, debt management services, some payment processing services, other types of consumer loans,
prepaid cards, and consumer debt collection.
The rule would also prohibit predispute arbitration agreements in connection with providing a consumer report or credit score to a
consumer or referring applicants to creditors
to whom requests for credit may be made.
Ironically, the CFPB chose to exclude the
federal government, its affiliates, and state
governments when providing consumer financial products or services, permitting the
government to enter into private arbitration class waivers, whereas private industry
cannot. The rule includes other exclusions,

such as for brokers under the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).
The proposed rule prohibits covered providers from “rely[ing] in any way on a predispute arbitration agreement” in connection with “any aspect of a class action that
is related to any of the consumer financial
services or products” covered by the rule
after the final rule’s effective date. The prohibition does not apply if the presiding court
has ruled that the case may not proceed as
a class action and the time for interlocutory
appellate review has passed.
For consumer arbitration agreements entered into after the effective date, the proposed rule requires the following arbitration
agreement language: “We agree that neither
we nor anyone else will use this agreement
to stop you from being part of a class action
case in court. You may file a class action in
court or you may be a member of a class action even if you do not file it.”
The effective compliance date will be
211 days after publication of the final rule
in the Federal Register. The Dodd-Frank
Act requires that any proposed rule apply
only to agreements entered into 180 days
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after the rule’s effective date, which is proposed as 30 days.
The proposed rule also provides for certain reporting requirements of arbitration results to the CFPB for any consumer arbitration that does occur, presumably when the
consumer elects to choose arbitration over
class actions. The provider must report the
initial claim and counterclaim, the arbitration agreement, the judgment or award, if
any, and any communication received from
an arbitrator or arbitral service regarding a
provider’s failure to pay required fees or a
finding that the arbitration agreement is out
of compliance with the arbitral service’s
fairness principles or due process rules.
In support of the rule, CFPB Director Cordray touted the benefits of the class action for
consumers, claiming that consumer financial
services “group lawsuits delivered, on average, about $220 million in payments to 6.8
million consumers per year.” But the CFPB’s
decision to require class resolution as superior dispute resolution vehicle to individual
arbitration is not necessarily supported by
the findings of the CFPB’s empirical arbitration study. Why are the study results so important? The Dodd-Frank Act delegates rulemaking authority on arbitration in consumer
financial products and services to the CFPB,
but any rules promulgated “must be consistent with the [arbitration] study.” 12 U.S.C.
§ 5518(b) (emphasis added).
The CFPB Ban on Class Arbitration
Waivers—What’s Happening Now

As noted above, the CFPB published the
proposed rule banning the use of class arbitration waivers in May 2016. The noticeand-comment period ended August 22,
2016. The CFPB was flooded with nearly
13,000 comments on the proposed rule,
both in favor of the rule and against it. A
number of consumer financial services representatives stated that the CFPB’s rule will
effectively end the viability of consumer
arbitration. Put simply, without the “carrot”
of a class arbitration waiver, a company has
no incentive to offer, much less to cover the
costs of, individual consumer arbitration.
Prior to the presidential election, most
folks thought the CFPB would publish the

proposed rule rather quickly. Even after
the election, many predicted that the CFPB
would publish the final rule banning class
waivers in consumer arbitration agreements
before President Trump’s inauguration. As
of the date of this article, the CFPB’s fall
2016 regulatory agenda identifies February
2017 as the target date for publication of
the final arbitration rule. But surprisingly,
the CFPB has not published a final rule yet.
There are a number of reasons the CFPB
may delay publishing the final rule. First,
one might expect any rule so blatantly antibusiness to draw the attention of President Trump, which could cause a flutter of
tweets or other social media ire.
Second, the CFPB’s previously impervious structure is now in question. In October 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in PHH Corp. v.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
839 F.3d 1, 8–9 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2016),
declared the directorship of the CFPB, set
up to be unaccountable to the executive, unconstitutional. The D.C. Circuit analyzed
the enormous power this single-director
structure gave the CFPB:
The CFPB’s concentration of enormous executive power in a single, unaccountable, unchecked Director not
only departs from settled historical
practice, but also poses a far greater
risk of arbitrary decision-making and
abuse of power, and a far greater threat
to individual liberty, than does a multimember independent agency.
...
This new agency, the CFPB, lacks
that critical check and structural constitutional protection, yet wields vast
power over the U.S. economy. So “this
wolf comes as a wolf.”
Id. at *4 (quoting Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting)). The D.C. Circuit chose to remedy the CFPB’s structural flaw not by
shutting down the CFPB, but by electing
the narrower remedy of severing the “for-

cause” director removal provision, making
the CFPB director removable at the will of
the president. The ramifications of this decision certainly affect the CFPB’s unwieldy
power, but the extent of that weakening remains to be seen.
The D.C. Circuit granted the CFPB’s petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the
panel’s opinion on February 16, 2017. The
en banc court hearing will be held on May
24, 2017. This opinion will likely have a
large effect on the scope of the CFPB, and
current Director Cordray’s authority under
this new administration. Even if the CFPB
goes forward with the final rule, it is likely
that it will face a slew of litigation from
industry advocates who support consumer
arbitration, which may deteriorate the effectiveness of the rule.
In the interim, to the extent the CFPB is
reconsidering the effectiveness of this watershed anti-arbitration rule, it could revise
the rule to still permit consumer arbitration
to develop, but under a regulatory regime
that is more pro-consumer. The CFPB arbitration study shows some defects in consumer arbitration in its current form, but it
also highlights some major deficits in consumer class actions.
The CFPB Arbitration Study: What is
Working In Consumer Arbitration, What
is Not

In 2015, the CFPB finished its multiyear
study of consumer financial arbitration before the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) and of class actions based on consumer financial services. Although the CFPB
states that the study shows “that class actions
provide a more effective means for consumers to challenge problematic practices” by
financial services companies, the results are
not quite so conclusive. The Arbitration Report showed:
• Over the three-year period of 2010–2012,
consumers filed an average of 411 claims
for arbitration in consumer financial services products. This is abysmally low.
• Of the 1,060 arbitration filings studied,
about 60 percent settled or ended in a
manner consistent with settlement. Only
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32 percent were resolved on the merits. This settlement figure suggests that
some sort of resolution is being achieved
prior to a merits decision in consumer
arbitration.
• Consumers had access to attorneys.
Counsel represented consumers in nearly
60 percent of the cases. Companies, of
course, nearly always had counsel.
• It appears that attorneys with arbitration
experience are representing these consumers. Repeat player attorneys represented
consumers in 50 percent of filings across
all consumer financial services product
markets. Forty-five percent of those filings were by “heavy” consumer repeat
players, meaning the attorney appeared
in four of more arbitration disputes in the
three-year study period. For student loan
disputes, heavy repeat player law firms
represented 93 percent of consumers.
• Dispute resolution is not a primary concern for consumer choice. When asked
about factors that are important in selecting a credit card, no consumer raised
dispute resolution. When asked, in a
telephone survey, what one would do if a
credit card company charged an improper fee, most respondents commonsensically answered he or she would cancel
the credit card. Less than 2 percent mentioned seeking legal advice or suing, but
10 percent said they would refer the issue
to a governmental agency.
What does this information tell us about
consumer arbitration? Well, first it tells us
that consumers are not pursuing consumer
arbitration at all, which is troubling. Are
consumers scared of arbitration? Unwary of
the procedure? Cynical of recovery? Or are
the arbitration fees still too high to make it
worth pursuing? The AAA currently caps a
consumer’s fees in consumer arbitration at
$200. The business portion of a consumer
arbitration, regardless of who initiates it, is
$1,700, plus an additional $750 arbitrator
compensation fee. Some businesses agree
to fully pay the costs of consumer arbitration in the arbitration agreement, and some
“consumer-friendly” agreements even offer to pay a premium and/or attorneys’ fees

if the consumer receives an arbitral award
that is greater than the business’s last settlement offer. The Arbitration Study did not
report on how often an arbitrator awards
such “incentivizing premiums,” but one
would think their very presence encourages
settlements.
The Arbitration Study also tells us that
for the few consumer cases being pursued,
consumers have access to attorney representation. The attorneys who tend to represent consumers in this dispute have developed a cottage niche, no doubt because
they are familiar with the AAA Consumer
Arbitration Rules and procedure. Finally,
the settlement figures tell us that something
useful is occurring in consumer arbitration.
In some way, perhaps due to the businessside costs of consumer arbitration or incentivizing premiums, parties are likely reaching a settlement resolution prior to a merits
decision.
The study also reported “win” rates for
affirmative consumer claims and for business claims. Remember that only 32 percent of the cases filed resulted in an arbitrator decision on the merits, thus the sample
size is very low. For claims brought by
consumers that resulted in a decision on
the merits, consumers “won” some kind
of relief in about 20 percent of the cases
(32/158). Businesses “won” relief in over
90 percent of the business-brought cases
(227/244) that went to a merits decision,
although some of the decisions were similar to a default judgment.
But one cannot make an assessment of
arbitration by simply comparing consumer
win rates to business win rates. As stated
above, the sample size of merits decision
was very small. More importantly, the
study shows that most arbitration disputes
resolved in a manner consistent with settlement. Additionally, differing incentives to
assert claims can explain some of the difference in outcomes. If a business funds all
or most of the dispute resolution process,
consumers are incentivized to bring claims
of questionable merit. Yet for the business
which must pay all or most of the upfront
costs ($1,700 per consumer claim under
AAA rules), the incentive is to not bring

(1) low value claims or (2) claims of questionable merit. Any comparative “win” rate
of consumers to businesses would need to
be compared to how consumers fare in litigation, not just how consumers fare compared to businesses, a point the Arbitration
Study made.
The CFPB Arbitration Study: What It
Tells Us About Individual Consumer
Recovery in Class Actions

The CFPB Consumer Arbitration Study
also examined class action recovery in consumer financial class actions. Although the
CFPB concluded, in proposing its arbitration class-waiver ban, that consumers are
better off preserving the class action than
waiving it, the study results do not support
this conclusion. For example, the CFPB
Arbitration Study found that approximately
60 percent of the consumer financial products class actions filed ended in a non-class
settlement or potential non-class settlement
(i.e., withdrawal or dismissal by the plaintiff). Only 12 percent (69 cases) reached
an approved class-action settlement. This
means that only a very small portion of
class actions filed resulted in any damages
to the class-member consumer. Yet those
class actions filed do result in a societal
drain on judicial resources and corporate
class action defense costs (which we would
assume are passed on in one form or other
to the consumer). Attorneys’ fees awarded
to counsel in class action settlements during the relevant time frame were $424 million, which is estimated at about 24 percent
of total class payments and 16 percent of
gross relief (proposed cash relief and in
kind relief).
Second, the average claims rate (claims
made as a percentage of eligible class members) was low, 21 percent, with an 8 percent
median. Thus, even when consumers obtain a settlement through the class device,
they usually do not take the administrative steps to obtain the payout. Finally, the
CFPB study did not attempt to provide data
on the average class member recovery for
those 69 cases that reached class settlement
or the difficulty of obtaining settlement
proceeds. But even taking Directory Cor-
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dray’s slogan of an average of “about $220
million in payments to 6.8 million consumers per year in consumer financial services
cases,” one could estimate this results in
about $32.35 in recovery to the individual
per year, that is, if he or she takes the time
to read and fill out the cumbersome forms
required for claims-made recovery. These
statistics cause one to at least question the
effectiveness of the class action for providing individual relief to the class members.
The CFPB Could Take a More Moderate
Approach to Facilitate Transparent and
Free Consumer Arbitration

What should we make of the data provided
above? First, it is premature to conclude that
the class action is a more effective dispute
resolution platform than individual arbitration. When only 12 percent of cases filed
results in any class settlement, it suggests
that there is a significant waste in the system.
Second, we know arbitration is chilling consumer activity. The CFPB could confront this
by providing more consumer education on
arbitration and requiring more transparency.
The CFPB could implement data-reporting
requirements (similar, but more extensive
than, those in the proposed rule for essentially post-dispute arbitration) that require reporting of the types of claims made, demand
amounts, counterclaims and amounts, case
resolutions, product types, and information
about consumer representation.
The CFPB should require any consumer

arbitration to be fully business-funded at
no cost to the consumer. When a business
faces transaction costs of nearly $2,000 per
arbitration filed, repeat consumer filings will
attract its attention. In addition, the CFPB
could consider requiring that any consumer arbitration which results in a favorable
consumer award on the merits should be
awarded treble damages and attorneys’ fees.
This provision would include a sort of “built
in” incentivizing provision. The goal of this
provision is to encourage organically what
we already see occurring, increased settlement of consumer disputes. Still further,
the CFPB should require that any consumer
arbitration award must result in a written
statement of decision, which permits other
consumers to know how the arbitrator applied the law to the facts of that case. This
will facilitate consumer knowledge of potential corporate overreach (and encourage
more recovery), and will also help aid the
consumer in arbitrator selection. The CFPB
has a number of measures it could take to
regulate consumer arbitration to the benefit
of the consumer, short of removing a potentially viable dispute resolution platform that
could benefit the individual consumer.
Conclusion

The CFPB’s proposed anti-arbitration rule
will have a wide effect on consumer financial services, and even potentially on other
consumer arbitration agreements. But the
CFPB’s arbitration class-waiver ban is es-

sentially an election of the class action to the
expense of individual arbitration. This policy
choice is premature and is not yet supported
by the data. The abysmally low number of
consumer arbitration filings is too low to
make generic assessments regarding the efficacy of consumer arbitration. But it tells us
consumers need to know more and have confidence to pursue their own low-value claims,
or be aware that attorney assistance may be
available. Even still, the image the Arbitration
Study paints of class actions show that this
vehicle is not providing satisfactory recovery
to the individual class members. But requiring businesses to fully fund and incentivize
consumer arbitration in a fair and transparent
way could provide a vehicle for individualized low-cost consumer relief. Will there
still be some de minimis claims that are not
pursued on the individual level? Yes. But this
tradeoff may be rational in the eyes of the
consumer to preserve an essentially free dispute resolution platform for economically rational claims. The CFPB should take the time
pending issuance of its final rule, under a new
Executive Branch, to issue regulations that
will make consumer arbitration more susceptible to empirical study, more transparent, and
cost free for the consumer.
Ramona L. Lampley is a Professor
of Law at St. Mary’s School of Law
in San Antonio, Texas. Her research
focuses on consumer arbitration and
civil procedure.

Published in Business Law Today, May 2017. © 2017 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any
portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written
consent of the American Bar Association.

4

